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if not, immunity from service would be granted. It is less harsh to
subject a defendant to service in a civil action growing out of the
same facts as the criminal action than it is to subject him to service
in a civil action wholly unrelated to the one to which he is involuntar-
ily responding. Refusing -to allow service by the plaintiff alleging dam-
ages occasioned by the same wrong would produce the anomalous situa-
tion of having the state seeking to make the defendant answer for
alleged injury to one of its citizens, but barring that citizen from
seeking relief on his own behalf. On the other hand, disallowing service
by a plaintiff seeking damages occasioned by defendants' acts which
were unrelated to the alleged criminal act protects the defendant from
service without producing this anomalous situation.
The above rule would apply to the facts of the Greene case as fol-
lows: The defendant would not be immune from service because his ap-
pearance was not voluntary, but compulsory, and the civil action and
criminal action grew out of the same occurrence. Thus the result would
be the same. But the rule proposed would have the virtue of giving
some consideration to the position of the involuntarily responding
defendant; it would not unnecessarily or unreasonably impair the
plaintiff's right to sue the defendant wherever he can be found.
Furthermore, continuing to provide immunity where the appearance
is voluntary protects the courts and their jurisdiction and facilitates
the disposition of cases.
IICHARD V. MATrINGLY, JR.
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE
The question of what minimum acts constitute "operating" a
motor vehicle arises in a number of situations. One of the most fre-
quent situations involves the "operating" of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating beverages. The decisions of the
courts in this situation are not uniform, nor are they consistent with
definitions of the term as applied in connection with other problems
was apprehended within the District, and charges were placed against him before
he was released on bond.
It may be added that the discussion in note 13 supra is equally pertinent with
regard to the provisions of § 25 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. If
personal jurisdiction may be obtained over an absent defendant, the provision im-
munizing him from service of civil process in the state to which he is extradited
becomes meaningless.
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such as licensing acts or insurance claims. For this reason it is im-
portant to consider both the jurisdiction using the definition and
the purpose for which it is used. Generally, it may be said that early
decisions indicated that some motion of the vehicle was a necessary
element of "operating" the vehicle. Later decisions are rejecting this
idea.
The current trend towards reducing, rather than enlarging, the
minimal requirements to constitute "operating" a vehicle was re-
cently demonstrated in the Georgia decision of Flournoy v. State.,
The police discovered the defendant sitting under the steering wheel
of his car, which was parked on the wrong side of the road. The engine
was running, but the car never moved from its parked position. The
trial court held that the defendant was "operating" his motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, even in the absence
of any motion of the vehicle. The Court of Appeals upheld the con-
viction. There being no Georgia decisions directly upon this point,
the court found from a consideration of decisions from other states
that motion of the vehicle is not an essential element of "operating"
an automobile. Instead, acts which worked the machinery of the
vehicle were sufficient.
State statutes generally prohibit both "operating" and "driving"
while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, with each of these
words defining an offense. No peculiar problem is involved where the
driver has been apprehended after having actually "driven" his car
for some substantial distance.
The question of whether a driver is "operating" as distinguished
from "driving" a vehicle arises in three distinct situations: (i) there
has been some movement of the vehicle; (2) there has been no move-
ment but some working of the mechanism of the vehicle; and (3) the
vehicle has been abandoned by the driver.
Where there has been some motion, but perhaps not a "driving"
of the vehicle, the courts have had little difficulty in finding there has
been an "operating" of the vehicle.2 The motion occurs generally
where the car has been started and moved only a few feet before the
driver is stopped and arrested.3 Motion may, however, have been very
slight, as where the car rolled a short distance without the motor
running.4 It is relatively easy to find that the defendant was "op-
l1o6 Ga. App. 756, 128 S.E.2d 528 (1962).
2Austin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 191, 170 S.E. 86 (1933); Echols v. State, 104
Ga. App. 695, 122 S.E.2d 473 (ig6i); State v. Roberts, 139 Me. 273, 29 A.2d 457 (1942).
3Austin v. State, 47 Ga. App. 191, 17o S.E. 86 (1933).
'The act of shifting the automobile's gears caused it to roll forward and
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erating" his vehicle in these cases because the operator has usually
intentionally caused the car to be set in motion. It is not necessary
that the car have moved under its own power, as drivers of vehicles
being towed and pushedO were held to be "operating" the vehicles.
Some differences of interpretation of what constitutes "operating"
in this first situation arise as a result of the difference between the
offences which the operator may commit. For example, courts are ap-
parently less likely to find that one has been "operating" his motor
vehicle where the offense charged is "operating" without a driver's
license7 or motor vehicle registration,8 than where the offense charged
is that of "operating" while under the influence of alcohol. This seem-
ing double standard becomes more understandable when one con-
siders the greater likelihood for injury resulting from "operating"
when the driver cannot control his vehicle because of his intoxicated
condition. For reasons such as the above it is important to make the
distinction between the types of criminal "operating" with which a
defendant is charged when any attempt is made to define the term.
The problem of defining this ambiguous term, "operating," in-
creases in complexity in the second situation where there has been
no motion at all by the vehicle, as in the Flournoy case. When the
courts, in these cases, find that there has been an "operating" of the
vehicle, it has usually been the result of the determination that one
who is charged with being the operator has, by some personal act,
worked the machinery of the vehicle.9 Courts which find "operating"
in the case of a motionless vehicle, often find that the issue of a possi-
bility of slight motion of the vehicle may not be important.10 The ele-
ment of "operating" is satisfied when the operator does such acts as
may alone or in a sequence of a mechanical or electrical nature, set
the motor of the vehicle in motion.1" The case is only strengthened
strike another vehicle. Although there was motion of the vehicle, the court found
the act of shifting the gears to be the prime element of "operating" the vehicle.
Commonwealth v. Clarke, 254 Mass. 566, 15o N.E. 829 (1926).
'State v. Tacey, 102 Vt. 439, 15o AtI. 68 (193o).
0Richardson v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 492 (D.C. Munic Ct. 1957).
'Dewhirst v. Connecticut Co., 96 Conn. 389, 114 At. 1oo (1921); Ricciardi v. Mc-
Mahon, 163 Misc. 659, 299 N.Y.S. 44o (Albany City Ct. 1937); Wolcott v. Renault
Selling Branch, 175 App. Div. 858, 162 N.Y.S. 496 (1916).
8Norcross v. B. L. Roberts Co., 239 Mass. 596, 132 N.E. 399 (1921).
OFlynn v. Kramer, 271 Mich. 5oo, 261 N.W. 77 (1935); Brown v. Cleveland
Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N.W. 557 (1933)-
'0Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22, 16o N.E. 3o5 (1928).
"The act of turning the ignition key and pushing starter to turn on a heater
caused the car to jump forward across the sidewalk and damage a theatre entrance.
The passenger who did this act was held to be "operating" the motor vehicle.
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by the slight motion of the vehicle.12 Neither is it important that the
attempted motion may have been prevented by some outside force,
such as a curb 13 or a ditch.14 The personal act which constitutes
"operating" in this minimal sense may be just stepping on the
starter 15 or turning the ignition key. 16 Not all courts are in agree-
ment with this conception of the word "operating" and apparently
feel that the intent to move forms an essential element to a finding
that the driver was "operating" the vehicle.17 Courts in these juris-
dictions have felt that such acts as holding the car on a hill by ap-
plying the brake' 8 or running the motor for a mechanic' 9 did not
constitute an "operating" of the vehicle. These cases cannot be dis-
tinguished from the rest solely upon the grounds of intent, however,
because there are courts which have found that not only is motion
unimportant, but intent to move is irrelevant as well.20 The problem
of defining the term "operating" in connection with offenses other
than "operating" while under the influence is not so marked in this
situation as it was in the first. Because the courts are not so uniform
in their definitions in this second situation as they were in the first,
the holdings in regard to charges of other types of "operating" do
not form any really independent group. These cases may therefore
be grouped along with the holdings of the courts which feel a re-
luctance to find an "operating" in violation of some statute unless
that type of "operating" is one against which the statute was specifically
designed to protect.
The third situation, where the vehicle is not only motionless,
but has been parked or even abandoned by the former driver, re-
quires the greatest extension of the definition of the word "operating."
Those states which already have a liberal interpretation of the term
have even further extended it to include situations where the inebriated
driver leaves his vehicle in a manner dangerous to others.2 ' In these
Bomes v. Crowley, 78 R.I. 453, 82 A.2d 867 (1951). The act of starting the motor
of a car after it has just been involved in an accident was held to be "operating"
that vehicle. State v. Ray, 4 N.J. Misc. 493, 133 AtI. 486 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
'-State v. Jalbert, 142 Me. 407, 53 A.2d 336 (1947).
"People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 N.Y.S. 288 (Erie County Ct. 1924).
" State v. Overbay, 2o Iowa 758, 206 N.W. 634 (1925).
EState v. Webb, 202 Iowa 633, 2o N.V. 751 (1926).
'cState v. Jones, 125 Me. 42, 13o Atl. 737 (1925); State v. Storrs, 1o5 Vt. i8o,
163 Atl. 56o (1933).
1
Underwood v. State, 24 Ala. App. 191, 132 So. 6o6 (1931).
2'State v. Hatcher, 2o N.C. 55, 185 S.E. 435 (1936).
"'State v. Sullivan, 146 Me. 381, 82 A.2d 629 (1951).
-'State v. Fox, 248 Iowa 1394, 85 N.W.2d 6o8 (1957); State v. Lorey, 197 Iowa
552, 197 N.W. 446 (1924).
"Barrington v. State, 145 Fla. 61, 199 So. 320 (1940).
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cases the problem is that of establishing the defendant as the intoxi-
cated "operator" of the vehicle. The courts of these states have held
that when this situation occurs, he was "operating" his vehicle so as
to be a hazard to others.22 In this third situation, again, as in the
other two previous situations, the courts appear more reluctant to
hold that there has been some "operating" of the vehicle where the
offense does not have the possibility of such severe consequences as
does "operating" while under the influence. A good example of this
type of offense is that of "operating" without displaying the proper
lights at night.23 Some of the courts have felt that it is necessary to
restrict this type of "operating" to stops made in the normal course
of road travel,2 4 such as delivering merchandise or shopping.25 Most
courts, however, have not been reluctant to find the former driver
guilty of careless or drunken "operating" of his vehicle when he
has endangered others by the way in which the car was left standing.
It is apparent, therefore, that although the courts of all states
are by no means uniform in their definition of the word "operating"
the definite trend appears to be a rejection of the concept that the
stationary nature of a vehicle precludes one from "operating" it. The
decision which was rendered in Flournoy v. State is indicative of this
trend. Courts seem to require less and less in the way of acts to es-
tablish an "operating" of the vehicle. Rather than leaving this without
any stopping point, some minimum requirements should perhaps be
established. "Intent to move" is one consideration that could be em-
ployed to separate those who pose some real menace from those who
may still occupy their vehicle but whose acts do not constitute any
potential danger. If no limits are set either by statute or by judicial
decision, then even the slightest relationship between the automo-
bile and the potential driver could be held to be an "operating" of
the vehicle. Several states have substituted or included as an alterna-
tive, the phrase, "actual physical control" for the word "operating."
When this concept is applied, the court may not even require any con-
Brandam v. State, 191 Tenn. 626, 235 S.V.2d Soi (195o).
"City of Harlan v. Kraschel, 164 Iowa 667, 146 N.V. 463 (1914); State v.
Bixby, 91 Vt. 287, 1oo At. 42 (1917).
2'Commonwealth v. Henry, 229 Mass. i9, 118 N.E. 224 (1918); Hand v. Frazier,
139 Misc. 446, 248 N.Y.S. 557 (i91); Horton v. Benson, 266 S.V. 213 (Tex. Ct.
App. x924); Lima Used Car Exch. Co. v. Hemperly, 12o Ohio St. 400, 166 N.E. 364
(1929); Maher v. Concannon, 56 R.I. 395, 185 At. 907 (1936); Scheppmann v.
Sweennes, 172 Minn. 493, 215 N.W. 861 (1927).
-Cook v. Crowell, 273 Mass. 356, 173 N.E. 587 (1930); Stroud v. Board of
Water Comm'rs, 90 Conn. 412, 97 At. 336 (1916).
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scious volition towards the vehicle, as in the case of the inebriated
driver slumped over the wheel.26
It is in the interest of the public welfare that the state seeks to
protect its citizens from the inebriate behind the wheel just as it
seeks to protect against other wrongful operators of automobiles. Those
states which have retained their strict definitions of the term "operat-
ing" will most likely be induced in the future to adopt the more lib-
eral construction of the word as drunken driving continues to pose
more and more of a threat to the public safety and well-being. Despite
this increase in action against the intoxicated driver, however, the
courts should be wary of becoming over-zealous in attempting to find
"operating" of the motor vehicle. It certainly appears that there is
a real need to establish some sort of uniformity in defining the term
"operating" especially as it applies to the drunk driving statutes. Cer-
tainly this definition would not be the same as that applied under
statutes passed for other purposes.27 Cases in other fields indicate that
the word can only be properly understood and therefore correctly ap-
plied when the purpose for which the statute was passed is considered
as the prime consideration in arriving at a definition.
Unless the courts begin to set some minimum limit on the nature
of acts which constitute "operating" then the statutes under which
the convictions are made will have lost all their value. The statutes
were not written to give the courts an unfettered license to convict,
and the courts, realizing this, should not try to convict on tenuous
grounds. Only if the acts have a reasonable relationship to the sort
of "operating" which the statute seeks to punish should the court find
that the defendant is guilty as charged. To permit convictions for lesser
acts than those prohibited is to lose sight of the whole purpose of
criminal statutes.
BEN P. MICHEL
3Houston v. District of Columbia, 149 A.2d 79o (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1959);
State v. Rouna, 113 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958); State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8,
274 P.2d 338 (954)-
2'A good example of this is the extreme case in which a car owner was held
to be "operating" his motor vehicle when he was changing a flat tire. This hold-
ing was made in regard to the possibility of recovery under an insurance policy
insuring against injuries received while "operating" the automobile. Union
Indemn. Co. v. Storm, 86 Ind. App. 562, 158 N.E. 904 (1927).
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